sábado, 24 de enero de 2015

El internet de las cosas

This post is excerpted from Jeremy Rifkin's new book, The Zero Marginal Cost Society: The Internet of Things, the Collaborative Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism, published today by Palgrave Macmillan.
If I had told you 25 years ago that, in a quarter century's time, one-third of the human race would be communicating with one another in huge global networks of hundreds of millions of people -- exchanging audio, video, and text -- and that the combined knowledge of the world would be accessible from a cellphone, that any single individual could post a new idea, introduce a product, or pass a thought to a billion people simultaneously, and that the cost of doing so would be nearly free, you would have shaken your head in disbelief. All are now reality.
But what if I were to say to you that 25 years from now, the bulk of the energy you use to heat your home and run your appliances, power your business, drive your vehicle, and operate every part of the global economy will likewise be nearly free? That's already the case for several million early adopters who have transformed their homes and businesses into micropower plants to harvest renewable energy on site. Even before any of the fixed costs for installation of solar and wind are paid back -- often in as little as two to eight years -- the marginal cost of the harvested energy is nearly free. Unlike fossil fuels and uranium for nuclear power, in which the commodity itself always costs something, the sun collected on your rooftop, the wind traveling up the side of your building, the heat coming up from the ground under your office, and the garbage anaerobically decomposing into biomass energy in your kitchen are all nearly free.
And what if prosumers everywhere were able to connect, produce and share their own energy, physical products, and services on a global Collaborative Commons, at low or near zero marginal cost? That too is beginning to evolve on a small scale as thousands of start-up businesses and hobbyists establish 3D-printing operations, infofacture products at near zero marginal cost, power their Fab Labs with green electricity, market their goods for nearly free on hundreds of global websites, and deliver their products in electric and fuel-cell vehicles powered by their own green energy.
A powerful new technology revolution is emerging that is going to fundamentally alter our economic life. The Communication Internet is converging with an embryonic Energy Internet and Logistics Internet to create a new technology platform -- the Internet of Things (IoT) -- that connects everything and everyone. Billions of sensors are being attached to natural resources, production lines, the electricity grid, logistics networks, recycling flows, and implanted in homes, offices, stores, and vehicles, feeding Big Data into the IoT global neural network. Small and medium sized enterprises and Prosumers will be able to connect to the network and use Big Data, analytics, and algorithms to accelerate efficiency, dramatically increase productivity, and lower the marginal cost of producing and sharing a wide range of physical products and services to near zero, making them nearly free, just like we now do with information goods.
The plummeting of marginal costs is spawning a hybrid economy -- part capitalist market and part Collaborative Commons -- with far reaching implications for society. Millions of people are already transferring parts of their economic lives to the global Collaborative Commons. Prosumers are plugging into the fledgling IoT and making and sharing their own information, entertainment, green energy, and 3D-printed products at near zero marginal cost. They are also sharing cars, homes, clothes and other items via social media sites, rentals, redistribution clubs, and cooperatives at low or near zero marginal cost. Meanwhile, students are enrolling in free massive open online courses (MOOCs) that operate at near zero marginal cost. Social entrepreneurs are even bypassing the banking establishment and using crowdfunding to finance socially responsible startup businesses as well as creating alternative currencies in the incipient sharing economy. In this new world, social capital is as important as financial capital, access trumps ownership, sustainability supersedes consumerism, cooperation ousts competition, and "exchange value" in the capitalist marketplace is increasingly replaced by "sharable value" on the Collaborative Commons.
The critical policy question now raging around the world is who will control the new IoT infrastructure and reap the vast benefits brought on by the unleashing of "extreme productivity"? The struggle to capture the IoT platform is being aggressively waged among governments, capitalist enterprises, and champions of an emerging Collaborative Commons, in courtrooms, legislatures and in the public arena. The outcome of this epic struggle will largely define the political landscape and the nature of economic activity as we move further into the twenty-first century.
Network Neutrality
Until the present, the Internet, and now the more expansive Internet of Things, has been managed as a global Commons with three primary stakeholders playing a collaborative role in its governance -- the government, private sector, and civil society. Now, however, the private sector is beginning to stray from the three-party stakeholder alliance, seeking increased income and profits by way of price discrimination -- a move that threatens to undermine one of the guiding principles of the Internet: network neutrality, a principle that assures a nondiscriminatory, open, universal Communications Commons in which every participant enjoys equal access and inclusion.
The concept of network neutrality grew out of the end-to-end design structure of the Internet, which favors the users rather than the network providers. While users pay for Internet connection, and the price they pay can depend on the speed or quality provided by their Internet service provider, once they're connected, their transmitted packets are treated the same way as everyone else's by the network providers.
Network providers -- the major telecom and cable companies -- would now like to change the rules of the game and secure control of information exchanged over the Internet of Things for commercial gain. That control would allow them to charge different prices for access to specific information or to prioritize transmissions, putting time-sensitive packets at the front of the line for a higher price, or charge application fees, or block specific applications from their networks in favor of others, again based on exacting discriminatory payments.
In January 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals¸ the nation's second highest court, knocked down the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) long-standing regulation requiring "network neutrality," arguing that the commission had overstepped its regulatory authority (the FCC is currently reviewing its policy of network neutrality with the goal of maintaining the principle of open access to the Internet of Things without running afoul of its mandate).
Proponents of network neutrality argue that the network should remain "stupid," thereby allowing millions of end users to collaborate and innovate by developing their own applications. It's this kind of "distributed intelligence" that makes the Internet such a unique communications medium. If network providers were to gain centralized control over access to content and how it is delivered, it would disempower end users and undermine the creativity that comes with distributed collaboration and laterally scaled intelligence.
The struggle over network neutrality is, at its core, a battle of paradigms. The Second Industrial Revolution telecom and cable companies would like to control the content and the traffic on the IoT, in order to boost their margins, and secure a monopoly by dint of their ownership of the "pipes." Prosumers are equally determined to keep the Internet of Things an open Commons and find new apps that will advance network collaboration and a push to near zero marginal costs and near free goods and services.
The Internet Monopolists
And it's not just the telecom and cable companies that are muscling in from the outside, attempting to enclose the IoT. It's coming from the inside as well. Some of the best-known social media sites on the Web are revving up to find new ways to enclose, commercialize, and monopolize the new communications medium. And their bite is potentially far bigger than the companies managing the pipes.
Unfortunately, some of the biggest Internet companies like Google, Facebook, and Twitter, are cashing in on the very rules of engagement that made them so successful and selling the masses of transmitted Big Data that comes their way to commercial bidders and businesses that use it for targeted advertising and marketing campaigns, research efforts, the development of new goods and services, and a host of other commercial propositions. They are, in effect, exploiting the Commons for commercial ends.
Should we worry about social media sites sharing everything they know about us with third-party commercial interests? Of course, no one wants to be pestered by targeted advertising. More sinister, however, is the prospect of health insurance companies learning whether you had been Googling research on specific illnesses or prospective employers prying into your personal social history by analyzing your data trail on the Web to spot potential quirks, idiosyncrasies, or even possible antisocial behavior.
Worse, is this newest form of commercial exploitation creating corporate monopolies in virtual space that are every bit as centralizing and proprietary as the Second Industrial Revolution companies they are dislodging from power? By 2013, Google was fielding almost 6 billion searches a day, and enjoyed a market share of 67 percent among search engines in the United States, 93 percent in Germany, 89 percent in the United Kingdom, and 95 percent in France.
Facebook has gobbled up 72.4 percent of the global market share of social networks, and as of January 2014, boasted over 1.3 billion active users--that's nearly one out of every six human beings living on Earth. Its visitors spend an average of 405 minutes a month on the site: that's the number of minutes of the next six most popular sites combined -- Tumblr (89), Pinterest (89), Twitter (21), LinkedIn (21), Myspace (8), and Google+ (3). Facebook's revenue in 2013 was $7.8 billion.
Twitter now has over 600 million registered users, of which 200 million are active tweeters. The rest prefer to be listeners. The company is expected to make more than $1 billion in revenue in 2014.
The overtly commercial sites, like Amazon and eBay, that include Collaborative Commons features, are also quickly becoming online monopolies. According to a study conducted by Forrester Research, one out of every three online users starts their product searches on Amazon.com, "compared to 13 percent who started their search from a traditional search site." Amazon has "over 152 million active Amazon customer accounts," "over 2 million active seller accounts," a worldwide logistical network that serves 178 countries, and enjoyed revenues in excess of $74 billion in 2013. By 2008, eBay had grabbed 99 percent of the market for online auctions in the United States, with a similar track record in most other industrialized countries. EBay's revenue in 2012 was $14.1 billion.
Tim Wu, a professor of law at Colombia University and a senior adviser to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, raises an interesting question about the new corporate giants that are colonizing large swaths of virtual space. He asks, "how hard would it be to go a week without Google? Or, to up the ante, without Facebook, Amazon, Skype, Twitter, Apple, eBay, and Google?" Wu is putting his finger on a disquieting new reality -- that the new communication medium a younger generation gravitated to because of its promise of openness, transparency, and deep social collaboration masks another persona more concerned with ringing up profit by advancing a networked Commons. Wu writes:
Most of the major sectors [on the Internet] today are controlled by one dominant company or an oligopoly. Google "owns" search; Facebook, social networking; eBay rules auctions; Apple dominates online content delivery; Amazon, retail; and so on.
Wu asks why the Internet looks "increasingly like a Monopoly board."
A growing number of communications-industry analysts and antitrust attorneys are asking whether these new heavyweights in virtual space are really "natural monopolies" like AT&T and the power and utility companies of the twentieth century and therefore either legitimate candidates for antitrust action or for regulation as public utilities. They argue that if one or both of these courses is not rigorously pursued, the great promise of the IoT as a shared global Commons is going to be irretrievably lost and, with it, the hopes and aspirations of a generation that has put such store on a peer-to-peer collaboratist ethos.
Empowering The Energy Internet
The telecommunication and cable companies, and the profit-making online enterprises are not the only commercial players attempting to thwart an open, transparent, and democratically managed Internet of Things infrastructure.
Already, the creation of an Internet of Things across locales, regions, countries, and continents is coming up against powerful, entrenched energy and electricity transmission companies with commercial interests every bit as formidable as the telecommunication companies, cable companies, and profit-making online enterprises.
Global energy companies and power and utility companies are, in some cases, blocking the creation of an Energy Internet altogether. In other instances, they are attempting to force a centralized architecture on the smart grid, to enable the commercial enclosure of the new energies.
The European Union, the world's largest economy, has taken steps to keep the Energy Internet an open architecture by requiring that conventional power and utility companies unbundle their power generation from their transmission of electricity. The unbundling regulations came about because of growing complaints by millions of small, new renewable energy producers that the big power and utility companies were making it difficult for them to connect their local micropower plants to the main transmission grid. The companies were also accused of discriminatory practices that favored speedy connectivity for green electricity generated by affiliated business partners and of imposing bureaucratic delays and even refusing to accept green electricity from others.
Electric utilities are also fighting on a second front, with behind-the-scenes maneuvers to design a smart grid that is centralized, proprietary, and closed, and in which all transmission data flows only in one direction, from prosumers to headquarters. The objective is to withhold vital information from the millions of new prosumers on moment-to-moment changes in the price of electricity as well as to prevent them from controlling when to upload their electricity onto the grid to take advantage of peak electricity prices at various times of the day.
These efforts by the electricity transmission companies appear to be losing steam as countries all over the world introduce green feed-in tariffs to encourage millions of end users to produce their own green electricity and share it across an Energy Internet.
The generation that grew up on the Communication Internet and that takes for granted its right to create value in distributed, collaborative, peer-to-peer virtual commons has little hesitation about generating their own green electricity and sharing it on an Energy Internet. They find themselves living through a deepening global economic crisis and an even more terrifying shift in Earth's climate, caused by an economic system reliant on fossil fuel energy and managed by centralized, top-down command and control systems. If they fault the giant telecommunications, media, and entertainment companies for blocking their right to collaborate freely with their peers in an open Information Commons, they are no less critical of the world's giant energy, power, and utility companies, which they blame, in part, for the high price of energy, a declining economy, and looming environmental crisis.
For a growing number of young people, the conventional energy and utility companies represent the very archetype of centralized power and all the ills that it has forced on the world. The prospect that those ills can be cured by joining together in open, collaborative, and democratically managed green electricity cooperatives to produce and share clean energy is empowering. It is inspiring a generation to rally under the banner of sustainability. The call for free access to communication is now being joined by the demands for near zero marginal cost green energy.
It's highly unlikely that the global companies attempting to capture the Internet of Things will escape some kind of regulatory restriction by way of either antitrust action or treating them as global social utilities with appropriate regulatory oversight. The nature and extent of the oversight is still very much an open question. What's not in question is the need to address the worrisome commercial enclosure of a technology platform whose very existence is predicated on the premise of providing a universal Commons in which all of humanity can collaborate and create value across every sector of social life at near zero marginal cost.
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2014-03-31-FinalZMCSCoverArt.jpg
The struggle between investor capitalists and prosumer collaboratists over control of the Internet of Things, while still embryonic, is shaping up to be the critical economic battle of the first half of the twenty-first century. Global telecom, cable, Internet, energy and electricity companies are determined to enclose the IoT and monopolize the flow of communication, power generation, and logistics, keeping the price of producing and distributing goods and services far above their marginal cost, to optimize their profits. The new prosumers, on the other hand, are increasingly banding together in lateral networks, producing and sharing information goods, renewable energy, 3D printed products, and an array of services on a global Collaborative Commons at near zero marginal costs, disrupting the workings of capitalist markets. The unfolding economic clash between the capitalists and collaboratists is a manifestation of a cultural conflict that will likely redefine the nature of the human journey in the years ahead. If there is an underlying theme to the emerging cultural conflict, it is the "monopolization vs. democratization of everything."
Jeremy Rifkin is the author of The Zero Marginal Cost Society: The Internet of Things, the Collaborative Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism. Rifkin is an advisor to the European Union and to heads of state around the world, and is the president of the Foundation on Economic Trends in Washington, DC. For more information, please go to www.thezeromarginalcostsociety.com.

Internet of things: Collaborative Economy vs Capitalism

This post is excerpted from Jeremy Rifkin's new book, The Zero Marginal Cost Society: The Internet of Things, the Collaborative Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism, published today by Palgrave Macmillan.
If I had told you 25 years ago that, in a quarter century's time, one-third of the human race would be communicating with one another in huge global networks of hundreds of millions of people -- exchanging audio, video, and text -- and that the combined knowledge of the world would be accessible from a cellphone, that any single individual could post a new idea, introduce a product, or pass a thought to a billion people simultaneously, and that the cost of doing so would be nearly free, you would have shaken your head in disbelief. All are now reality.
But what if I were to say to you that 25 years from now, the bulk of the energy you use to heat your home and run your appliances, power your business, drive your vehicle, and operate every part of the global economy will likewise be nearly free? That's already the case for several million early adopters who have transformed their homes and businesses into micropower plants to harvest renewable energy on site. Even before any of the fixed costs for installation of solar and wind are paid back -- often in as little as two to eight years -- the marginal cost of the harvested energy is nearly free. Unlike fossil fuels and uranium for nuclear power, in which the commodity itself always costs something, the sun collected on your rooftop, the wind traveling up the side of your building, the heat coming up from the ground under your office, and the garbage anaerobically decomposing into biomass energy in your kitchen are all nearly free.
And what if prosumers everywhere were able to connect, produce and share their own energy, physical products, and services on a global Collaborative Commons, at low or near zero marginal cost? That too is beginning to evolve on a small scale as thousands of start-up businesses and hobbyists establish 3D-printing operations, infofacture products at near zero marginal cost, power their Fab Labs with green electricity, market their goods for nearly free on hundreds of global websites, and deliver their products in electric and fuel-cell vehicles powered by their own green energy.
A powerful new technology revolution is emerging that is going to fundamentally alter our economic life. The Communication Internet is converging with an embryonic Energy Internet and Logistics Internet to create a new technology platform -- the Internet of Things (IoT) -- that connects everything and everyone. Billions of sensors are being attached to natural resources, production lines, the electricity grid, logistics networks, recycling flows, and implanted in homes, offices, stores, and vehicles, feeding Big Data into the IoT global neural network. Small and medium sized enterprises and Prosumers will be able to connect to the network and use Big Data, analytics, and algorithms to accelerate efficiency, dramatically increase productivity, and lower the marginal cost of producing and sharing a wide range of physical products and services to near zero, making them nearly free, just like we now do with information goods.
The plummeting of marginal costs is spawning a hybrid economy -- part capitalist market and part Collaborative Commons -- with far reaching implications for society. Millions of people are already transferring parts of their economic lives to the global Collaborative Commons. Prosumers are plugging into the fledgling IoT and making and sharing their own information, entertainment, green energy, and 3D-printed products at near zero marginal cost. They are also sharing cars, homes, clothes and other items via social media sites, rentals, redistribution clubs, and cooperatives at low or near zero marginal cost. Meanwhile, students are enrolling in free massive open online courses (MOOCs) that operate at near zero marginal cost. Social entrepreneurs are even bypassing the banking establishment and using crowdfunding to finance socially responsible startup businesses as well as creating alternative currencies in the incipient sharing economy. In this new world, social capital is as important as financial capital, access trumps ownership, sustainability supersedes consumerism, cooperation ousts competition, and "exchange value" in the capitalist marketplace is increasingly replaced by "sharable value" on the Collaborative Commons.
The critical policy question now raging around the world is who will control the new IoT infrastructure and reap the vast benefits brought on by the unleashing of "extreme productivity"? The struggle to capture the IoT platform is being aggressively waged among governments, capitalist enterprises, and champions of an emerging Collaborative Commons, in courtrooms, legislatures and in the public arena. The outcome of this epic struggle will largely define the political landscape and the nature of economic activity as we move further into the twenty-first century.
Network Neutrality
Until the present, the Internet, and now the more expansive Internet of Things, has been managed as a global Commons with three primary stakeholders playing a collaborative role in its governance -- the government, private sector, and civil society. Now, however, the private sector is beginning to stray from the three-party stakeholder alliance, seeking increased income and profits by way of price discrimination -- a move that threatens to undermine one of the guiding principles of the Internet: network neutrality, a principle that assures a nondiscriminatory, open, universal Communications Commons in which every participant enjoys equal access and inclusion.
The concept of network neutrality grew out of the end-to-end design structure of the Internet, which favors the users rather than the network providers. While users pay for Internet connection, and the price they pay can depend on the speed or quality provided by their Internet service provider, once they're connected, their transmitted packets are treated the same way as everyone else's by the network providers.

Network providers -- the major telecom and cable companies -- would now like to change the rules of the game and secure control of information exchanged over the Internet of Things for commercial gain. That control would allow them to charge different prices for access to specific information or to prioritize transmissions, putting time-sensitive packets at the front of the line for a higher price, or charge application fees, or block specific applications from their networks in favor of others, again based on exacting discriminatory payments.
In January 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals¸ the nation's second highest court, knocked down the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) long-standing regulation requiring "network neutrality," arguing that the commission had overstepped its regulatory authority (the FCC is currently reviewing its policy of network neutrality with the goal of maintaining the principle of open access to the Internet of Things without running afoul of its mandate).
Proponents of network neutrality argue that the network should remain "stupid," thereby allowing millions of end users to collaborate and innovate by developing their own applications. It's this kind of "distributed intelligence" that makes the Internet such a unique communications medium. If network providers were to gain centralized control over access to content and how it is delivered, it would disempower end users and undermine the creativity that comes with distributed collaboration and laterally scaled intelligence.
The struggle over network neutrality is, at its core, a battle of paradigms. The Second Industrial Revolution telecom and cable companies would like to control the content and the traffic on the IoT, in order to boost their margins, and secure a monopoly by dint of their ownership of the "pipes." Prosumers are equally determined to keep the Internet of Things an open Commons and find new apps that will advance network collaboration and a push to near zero marginal costs and near free goods and services.
The Internet Monopolists
And it's not just the telecom and cable companies that are muscling in from the outside, attempting to enclose the IoT. It's coming from the inside as well. Some of the best-known social media sites on the Web are revving up to find new ways to enclose, commercialize, and monopolize the new communications medium. And their bite is potentially far bigger than the companies managing the pipes.
Unfortunately, some of the biggest Internet companies like Google, Facebook, and Twitter, are cashing in on the very rules of engagement that made them so successful and selling the masses of transmitted Big Data that comes their way to commercial bidders and businesses that use it for targeted advertising and marketing campaigns, research efforts, the development of new goods and services, and a host of other commercial propositions. They are, in effect, exploiting the Commons for commercial ends.
Should we worry about social media sites sharing everything they know about us with third-party commercial interests? Of course, no one wants to be pestered by targeted advertising. More sinister, however, is the prospect of health insurance companies learning whether you had been Googling research on specific illnesses or prospective employers prying into your personal social history by analyzing your data trail on the Web to spot potential quirks, idiosyncrasies, or even possible antisocial behavior.
Worse, is this newest form of commercial exploitation creating corporate monopolies in virtual space that are every bit as centralizing and proprietary as the Second Industrial Revolution companies they are dislodging from power? By 2013, Google was fielding almost 6 billion searches a day, and enjoyed a market share of 67 percent among search engines in the United States, 93 percent in Germany, 89 percent in the United Kingdom, and 95 percent in France.
Facebook has gobbled up 72.4 percent of the global market share of social networks, and as of January 2014, boasted over 1.3 billion active users--that's nearly one out of every six human beings living on Earth. Its visitors spend an average of 405 minutes a month on the site: that's the number of minutes of the next six most popular sites combined -- Tumblr (89), Pinterest (89), Twitter (21), LinkedIn (21), Myspace (8), and Google+ (3). Facebook's revenue in 2013 was $7.8 billion.
Twitter now has over 600 million registered users, of which 200 million are active tweeters. The rest prefer to be listeners. The company is expected to make more than $1 billion in revenue in 2014.
The overtly commercial sites, like Amazon and eBay, that include Collaborative Commons features, are also quickly becoming online monopolies. According to a study conducted by Forrester Research, one out of every three online users starts their product searches on Amazon.com, "compared to 13 percent who started their search from a traditional search site." Amazon has "over 152 million active Amazon customer accounts," "over 2 million active seller accounts," a worldwide logistical network that serves 178 countries, and enjoyed revenues in excess of $74 billion in 2013. By 2008, eBay had grabbed 99 percent of the market for online auctions in the United States, with a similar track record in most other industrialized countries. EBay's revenue in 2012 was $14.1 billion.
Tim Wu, a professor of law at Colombia University and a senior adviser to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, raises an interesting question about the new corporate giants that are colonizing large swaths of virtual space. He asks, "how hard would it be to go a week without Google? Or, to up the ante, without Facebook, Amazon, Skype, Twitter, Apple, eBay, and Google?" Wu is putting his finger on a disquieting new reality -- that the new communication medium a younger generation gravitated to because of its promise of openness, transparency, and deep social collaboration masks another persona more concerned with ringing up profit by advancing a networked Commons. Wu writes:
Most of the major sectors [on the Internet] today are controlled by one dominant company or an oligopoly. Google "owns" search; Facebook, social networking; eBay rules auctions; Apple dominates online content delivery; Amazon, retail; and so on.
Wu asks why the Internet looks "increasingly like a Monopoly board."
A growing number of communications-industry analysts and antitrust attorneys are asking whether these new heavyweights in virtual space are really "natural monopolies" like AT&T and the power and utility companies of the twentieth century and therefore either legitimate candidates for antitrust action or for regulation as public utilities. They argue that if one or both of these courses is not rigorously pursued, the great promise of the IoT as a shared global Commons is going to be irretrievably lost and, with it, the hopes and aspirations of a generation that has put such store on a peer-to-peer collaboratist ethos.
Empowering The Energy Internet
The telecommunication and cable companies, and the profit-making online enterprises are not the only commercial players attempting to thwart an open, transparent, and democratically managed Internet of Things infrastructure.
Already, the creation of an Internet of Things across locales, regions, countries, and continents is coming up against powerful, entrenched energy and electricity transmission companies with commercial interests every bit as formidable as the telecommunication companies, cable companies, and profit-making online enterprises.
Global energy companies and power and utility companies are, in some cases, blocking the creation of an Energy Internet altogether. In other instances, they are attempting to force a centralized architecture on the smart grid, to enable the commercial enclosure of the new energies.
The European Union, the world's largest economy, has taken steps to keep the Energy Internet an open architecture by requiring that conventional power and utility companies unbundle their power generation from their transmission of electricity. The unbundling regulations came about because of growing complaints by millions of small, new renewable energy producers that the big power and utility companies were making it difficult for them to connect their local micropower plants to the main transmission grid. The companies were also accused of discriminatory practices that favored speedy connectivity for green electricity generated by affiliated business partners and of imposing bureaucratic delays and even refusing to accept green electricity from others.
Electric utilities are also fighting on a second front, with behind-the-scenes maneuvers to design a smart grid that is centralized, proprietary, and closed, and in which all transmission data flows only in one direction, from prosumers to headquarters. The objective is to withhold vital information from the millions of new prosumers on moment-to-moment changes in the price of electricity as well as to prevent them from controlling when to upload their electricity onto the grid to take advantage of peak electricity prices at various times of the day.
These efforts by the electricity transmission companies appear to be losing steam as countries all over the world introduce green feed-in tariffs to encourage millions of end users to produce their own green electricity and share it across an Energy Internet.
The generation that grew up on the Communication Internet and that takes for granted its right to create value in distributed, collaborative, peer-to-peer virtual commons has little hesitation about generating their own green electricity and sharing it on an Energy Internet. They find themselves living through a deepening global economic crisis and an even more terrifying shift in Earth's climate, caused by an economic system reliant on fossil fuel energy and managed by centralized, top-down command and control systems. If they fault the giant telecommunications, media, and entertainment companies for blocking their right to collaborate freely with their peers in an open Information Commons, they are no less critical of the world's giant energy, power, and utility companies, which they blame, in part, for the high price of energy, a declining economy, and looming environmental crisis.
For a growing number of young people, the conventional energy and utility companies represent the very archetype of centralized power and all the ills that it has forced on the world. The prospect that those ills can be cured by joining together in open, collaborative, and democratically managed green electricity cooperatives to produce and share clean energy is empowering. It is inspiring a generation to rally under the banner of sustainability. The call for free access to communication is now being joined by the demands for near zero marginal cost green energy.
It's highly unlikely that the global companies attempting to capture the Internet of Things will escape some kind of regulatory restriction by way of either antitrust action or treating them as global social utilities with appropriate regulatory oversight. The nature and extent of the oversight is still very much an open question. What's not in question is the need to address the worrisome commercial enclosure of a technology platform whose very existence is predicated on the premise of providing a universal Commons in which all of humanity can collaborate and create value across every sector of social life at near zero marginal cost.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2014-03-31-FinalZMCSCoverArt.jpg

The struggle between investor capitalists and prosumer collaboratists over control of the Internet of Things, while still embryonic, is shaping up to be the critical economic battle of the first half of the twenty-first century. Global telecom, cable, Internet, energy and electricity companies are determined to enclose the IoT and monopolize the flow of communication, power generation, and logistics, keeping the price of producing and distributing goods and services far above their marginal cost, to optimize their profits. The new prosumers, on the other hand, are increasingly banding together in lateral networks, producing and sharing information goods, renewable energy, 3D printed products, and an array of services on a global Collaborative Commons at near zero marginal costs, disrupting the workings of capitalist markets. The unfolding economic clash between the capitalists and collaboratists is a manifestation of a cultural conflict that will likely redefine the nature of the human journey in the years ahead. If there is an underlying theme to the emerging cultural conflict, it is the "monopolization vs. democratization of everything."

Jeremy Rifkin is the author of The Zero Marginal Cost Society: The Internet of Things, the Collaborative Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism. Rifkin is an advisor to the European Union and to heads of state around the world, and is the president of the Foundation on Economic Trends in Washington, DC. For more information, please go to www.thezeromarginalcostsociety.com.

Economia colaborativa vs capitalismo


 Jeremy Rifkin, que venía a hablar de su último libro, La sociedad de coste marginal cero (Paidós).

Jeremy Rifkin: "En 35 años el capitalismo ya no será el modelo dominante"

“Estamos en un proceso de cambio en el modelo económico por el propio desarrollo del capitalismo. Dentro de 35 años, las cosas serán completamente diferentes. Es muy posible que el capitalismo ya no sea el modelo hegemónico y que tenga que cohabitar con otro sistema. El capitalismo convivirá con la economía colaborativa”, afirmó Rifkin.

NO SIEMPRE ESTUVIMOS TAN OBSESIONADOS CON LA PROPIEDAD O EL INDIVIDUALISMO
Cuando Rifkin habla de economía colaborativa, habla de BlaBlaCar, la plataforma online que pone a los propietarios de un coche en contacto con viajeros para realizar juntos un trayecto de larga distancia y compartir gastos -y que ya alcanza diez millones de usuarios en Europa-. O las cooperativas de energía renovable que, según Rifkin, en Alemania producen casi el 27% de energía eléctrica y controlan casi todo el mercado de energía verde, donde las grandes eléctricas como EON sólo generan un 7% del total. O de empresas o servicios como Couchsurfing y BeWelcome, redes de alojamiento en la que uno se apunta con la condición de recibir también viajeros en sus casas. Todo cada vez a menores precios. A veces, a ninguno.

No siempre estuvimos tan obsesionados con la propiedad o el individualismo, como ha ocurrido desde la Ilustración y los orígenes del capitalismo. En su libro, Rifkin pone como ejemplo de colectivismo una época con tan mala fama como la Edad Media: “La agricultura feudal presentaba una estructura comunal. Los campesinos unían sus parcelas en pastos y campos comunes que cultivaban entre todos. El procomún se convirtió en el primer ejercicio de toma de decisiones democrática de Europa”.

"LOS COSTES MARGINALES ESTÁN A PUNTO DE LLEGAR A CERO Y LOS PRODUCTOS TECNOLÓGICOS SERÁN MUY BARATOS"
¿Pero cómo es que se dan ahora las condiciones para ese procomún colaborativo versión siglo XXI?

“Las cosas cada vez cuestan menos. Todo producto tiene unos costes fijos, los que corresponden a la inversión inicial en infraestructura y equipos necesarios para producirlos. Y unos costes marginales, que son costes añadidos de transporte, intermediarios, etc, que dan márgenes de beneficio al producto. Pero estamos ante una revolución económica, un cambio de paradigma. Con Internet, las energías renovables, el coche eléctrico o la impresora 3D, los costes marginales están a punto de llegar a cero y los grandes instrumentos tecnológicos van a costar muy poco dinero.

En la sociedad que dibuja Rifkin, los niños de dentro de diez años utilizarán impresoras 3D y se convertirán en “prosumidores”, gente que produce y consume sus propias cosas, poniendo en peligro las viejas industrias manufactureras. “En Chicago se acaba de imprimir el primer coche. Se llama Strati y sólo el chasis se ha hecho de manera convencional”, dice Rifkin con pinta de estar entusiasmado. Las casas estarán conectadas a redes y sensores inteligentes que darán todo tipo de información sobre consumo, temperatura, etc. Según Rifkin, se calcula que habrá 100.000 millones de sensores en 2020. Muchos de ellos estarán conectados a autopistas inteligentes, donde habrá que recargar los coches eléctricos. O a redes de información pública donde se dará cuenta de los gastos presupuestarios y las cuentas de nuestras instituciones. Será una era de gran transparencia dominada por lo que Rifkin llama el "Internet de las cosas". Y todo se alimentará con energía verde. “El watio solar costaba entre 65-70 dólares en los años 70. Ahora cuesta 60 céntimos. El sol, el viento y la energía geotérmica no pasan factura”.

Hay también un cambio de mentalidad, sobre todo en los jóvenes. Se han acostumbrado a compartir. No buscan tener un coche, sino poder moverse de un sitio a otro. Les gusta viajar, pero no necesitan grandes hoteles, sino sitios baratos donde quedarse. Escuchan música, pero no necesitan ninguna estantería llena de discos. Vale con Youtube o Spotify.

También se mencionó a los malos, a los que pueden poner obstáculos en el camino: las grandes corporaciones. ¿Qué hay de Facebook o de Google, que tienen paquetes de información sobre todos nosotros y sacan dinero con ellos? ¿Y las grandes eléctricas? ¿Dejarán que pequeñas cooperativas les coman el pastel de las renovables? “Igual que en el siglo XIX los obreros se movilizaron contra los grandes capitalistas que los depauperaron, estoy seguro de que miles de millones de personas no se van a dejar doblegar por las grandes corporaciones".

"SI EL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL QUISIERA, MAÑANA MISMO SE EMPEZARÍAN A CREAR PUESTOS DE TRABAJO"
Por último, Rifkin dejó unas cuantas perlas para consumo nacional: “España iba por el buen camino con su inversión en energía solar, pero el Gobierno cambió completamente su política: es una pena”. Luego habló directamente sobre el presidente del Gobierno: “Rajoy dice que yo soy un teatrero que vive en la fantasía. Pues entonces, Alemania también es una teatrera, que va justo en la dirección que yo propongo y cuya canciller me llamó justo después de formar el último Gobierno. O el vicepresidente de Google, que afirma que en pocas décadas sólo habrá energías renovables. O el New York Times, cuyo periodista, Justin Gillis, publicaba el otro día en portada un artículo hablando de las cuestiones que planteo en mi libro”.

Pero dijo algo más inquietante, al mismo tiempo que esperanzador: “Si el Gobierno español quisiera, mañana mismo se empezarían a crear puestos de trabajo. Hace falta rehabilitar los edificios para que creen energía verde, para que sean eficientes energéticamente. Hay que cambiar los cableados, tienen que renovarse las autopistas y prepararlas para el coche eléctrico, habrá que poner millones de sensores, zonas donde cargar los coches, etc. Para hacer la transición a la nueva economía se necesitarán 40 años, eso son dos generaciones. Es mentira decir que no hay dinero, hay inversores privados, hay fondos de la UE, inversiones que puede realizar el Gobierno en lugar de seguir subvencionando las energía fósiles. Si Nord Pas de Calais, que es una región pobre del norte de Francia puede hacerlo, España también puede. Allí hay grandes empresas como Schneider o Renault, que están trabajando con pequeños empresarios de la zona”. Pero claro, para todo eso hace falta un contexto: “Tiene que haber capacidad de liderazgo en política. Y una sociedad civil que esté muy activa”.

Ya en ese momento álgido de la conversación había llegado a la suite un sándwich de dos pisos con abundante lechuga de roble acompañado de un vaso de leche. “Bueno, y ahora me perdonaréis, pero no tengo más tiempo. Escribid vuestras historias, pero os dejo mi tarjeta, por si me queréis contactar conmigo en un par de semanas”. Y como si estuvieran conectados por sensores, ese sándwich debió abrir el apetito a la mitad de la sala y los periodistas se marcharon con disciplina. A chistar a otra parte. 

miércoles, 3 de diciembre de 2014

La estructura productiva en America Latina y las politicas publicas


En los últimos 50 años, Latinoamérica no ha sido capaz de converger en términos de bienestar con los países más desarrollados. Aunque en relación con 1960 la renta per capita de Latinoamérica en dólares constantes se ha multiplicado por 4,5, respecto al ciudadano estadounidense la brecha de bienestar es hoy un 8% mayor que la que padecían sus padres o abuelos. Mientras, los emergentes asiáticos hacían de las últimas décadas la plataforma para su despegue al desarrollo. Singapur, que en 1960 tenía una renta per capita equivalente a la que tenía Ecuador, ya ha convergido con la de EE UU. Corea, en los sesenta igual de próspero que Brasil, hoy tiene un 66% de la renta norteamericana y ha sobrepasado el nivel de vida del ciudadano español. China, con una renta inferior a la vigésima parte de la americana, ha llegado a los 10.000 dólares en dos décadas.

Como muchos otros, en el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) llevamos años tratando de identificar las razones del decepcionante comportamiento diferencial de la región. Como ocurre con los problemas complejos, no hay una explicación única. A lo largo de los años hemos ido construyendo una agenda de investigación que, huyendo de los prejuicios, se apoya sobre la mejor evidencia empírica y marcos analíticos rigurosos que mejoran nuestra comprensión del problema y, con ella, nuestra capacidad para contribuir eficazmente al diálogo de política económica.

Durante muchos años fue obvio que el mayor enemigo de la convergencia de renta del continente era su inestabilidad macroeconómica. La sucesión de crisis financieras, fiscales, cambiarias e hiperinflaciones era la seña de identidad macroeconómica de la región. Aquello acabó hace tiempo, cuando buena parte de los países de la región demostraron haber aprendido las lecciones de aquellas crisis, creando instituciones y políticas que mejoraron los fundamentos macro de la región. Sin embargo, recobrar —y mantener— la estabilidad macroeconómica fue condición necesaria pero no suficiente para la convergencia real.

Cuando la evidencia se impuso, el foco se desplazó hacia el potencial productivo. También era un dato que Latinoamérica contaba con menos capital físico y humano que los países desarrollados. Menos máquinas, menos años de escolarización. Esta explicación aunque correcta, era parcial: a lo largo de estos últimos 50 años la región ha acumulado capital físico, creado empleo y mejorado su capital humano a mayor velocidad que EE UU. Si la convergencia sólo dependiera de la acumulación de factores, el ciudadano de Latinoamérica habría cerrado en más de un 25% su brecha de bienestar con el vecino americano. Pero ocurrió todo lo contrario. La inferencia por tanto debe ser que el principal problema es la eficiencia con la que se combinan los factores de producción; lo que los economistas llamamos productividad total de los factores. En ese campo, los logros de la región eran más que decepcionantes: mientras que Asia redujo a dos tercios su brecha de productividad relativa frente a EE UU, Latinoamérica la duplicó, convirtiendo la convergencia de la acumulación de factores en divergencia neta de bienestar.

Hay que debatir la mejora de la productividad y buscar la colaboración del Estado y el sector privado

Los niveles de desigualdad, la informalidad del mercado de trabajo —algo más de la mitad de los latinoamericanos empleados trabajan en la economía informal—, el tamaño de las empresas, las deficiencias de salud y educación, la falta de infraestructuras, la seguridad ciudadana, la debilidad institucional, la corrupción son, entre otros, factores relevantes que coadyuvan para que el continente no crezca más. Sobre cada uno hay muchos estudios que nos han enseñado la naturaleza del problema e informado de algunas propuestas de reformas estructurales para corregirlos.

Una perspectiva complementaria de la anterior es preguntarse por qué el papel que las políticas activas de desarrollo productivo tuvieron en Asia no fue emulado en Latinoamérica. Una posible razón es que el continente tuvo en el pasado reciente malas experiencias con ellas. Las políticas industriales fueron parte nuclear de las estrategias de desarrollo de muchas economías del continente, si bien su diseño respondía más bien al objetivo de proteger el mercado interno y acelerar la industrialización, y no al de perseguir el aumento de la competitividad internacional. En gran medida no funcionaron. Con frecuencia se convirtieron en fuente de inestabilidad macroeconómica, origen de malas asignaciones de recursos, de corrupción y de captura del Estado por parte de los buscadores de rentas. Por todo ello se ganaron a pulso que la frase de “la mejor política industrial es la que no existe” ocupe todavía hoy un lugar destacado en el imaginario de la región.

En Asia, las políticas de desarrollo productivo fueron diseñadas para impulsar la productividad en un entorno de economías abiertas. Tenían instrumentos claramente definidos ligados a objetivos de exportación y criterios cuantificados, y prestaban una atención especial a los incentivos microeconómicos y a la colaboración entre el sector público y privado. Y esas políticas activas de desarrollo funcionaron.

Se trata de propiciar la adopción de políticas activas con objetivos claros y resultados medibles

El principal mensaje del informe del año 2014 del BID (¿Cómo repensar el desarrollo productivo? Políticas e instituciones sólidas para la transformación económica), es simple: creemos que la región debe pasar página e ir más allá de la pasividad de las políticas de desarrollo auspiciada por el Consenso de Washington. Con el crecimiento mundial en desaceleración y un entorno externo menos favorable para Latinoamérica, es un imperativo impostergable.

No es una vuelta al pasado. Tampoco un recetario de políticas o de mejores prácticas para aplicar sin tener en cuenta las necesidades y singularidades de cada economía. Lo que se propone es situar en el centro del debate económico la mejora de la productividad para, sin apriorismos y con evidencia sólida y contrastada, encontrar los espacios de colaboración del Estado y el sector privado que propicien la adopción de políticas activas con objetivos claros y resultados medibles. Para ello es necesario que su diseño, gestión y evaluación esté encomendada a instituciones transparentes y con capacidad de defenderse de la captura por parte de los buscadores de renta.

No es fácil, pero tampoco imposible. En la región hay prácticas —más de las que se piensa— que han sobrevivido a la demonización de las políticas industriales y siguen conspirando contra el bienestar general. Pero también hay una nueva generación de políticas que funcionan.

En vez de renunciar ciegamente a ser proactivos, lo que se necesita es un marco conceptual que discierna entre buenas y malas políticas. Para ello proponemos una terna de pruebas. Primera: para evitar las ocurrencias y las improvisaciones, antes de anunciar una política pública hay que identificar con precisión qué falla de mercado se pretende solucionar; no siempre se ha hecho, y las consecuencias han sido políticas brumosas sin justificación que no pueden ser evaluadas ni juzgadas por sus méritos. Segunda: a la luz del problema que se pretende solucionar, cuál es el instrumento más apropiado como solución; no todo vale, no se trata de disponer subsidios o desgravaciones fiscales a troche y moche sino de usar instrumentos idóneos para atender la falla de mercado con precisión. Finalmente, la tercera prueba es la verificación de que existen las capacidades institucionales para adoptar la política con éxito: identificar la institución en condiciones de encargarse de ponerla en práctica, gestionar sus recursos, medir sus resultados y garantizar que es capaz de preservar su autonomía frente a los grupos de intereses que potencialmente pretendan capturarla.

Se trata de hacer políticas públicas de desarrollo productivo con objetivos e instrumentos claramente validados y con resultados evaluables, gestionadas por instituciones transparentes y autónomas. Aunque parezca simple, no lo es. Gastar mejor para crecer más es una idea deslumbrante en su sencillez conceptual, aunque también en su dificultad en la práctica. Pero ya está germinando y creciendo en la región. Y conviene que lo sepan, porque este enfoque puede servirles para los retos de crecimiento que España tiene y que, al fin y al cabo, también se resumen en el bajo crecimiento de la productividad de los factores y su dual mercado de trabajo.

José Juan Ruiz es economista jefe del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID). Eduardo Fernández-Arias y Ernesto Stein son economistas del departamento de Investigación del BID. Acaban de publicar ¿Cómo repensar el desarrollo productivo?, que se puede descargar en http://publications.iadb.org/

La innovacion en America Latina


El gasto en innovación y desarrollo (I+D) en América Latina ha crecido en los últimos años, pero aún sigue lejos del de las regiones más punteras. La inversión latinoamericana en I+D llegó al 0,78% del PIB en 2011, el último año con datos disponibles recopilados por el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID). La tasa es superior al 0,48% y al 0,57% que se registraba en 1990 y 2000 respectivamente, según la base de datos de la organización con sede en Washington. Pero sigue a mucha distancia del 2,8% de Estados Unidos y de los niveles de los líderes mundiales, como Corea del Sur (3,7%), Finlandia (3,9%) o Israel (4,3%).

“Hay un enorme déficit de innovación en América Latina”, admite el presidente del BID, Luis Alberto Moreno, en una entrevista con motivo de las jornadas sobre innovación que celebró este martes el banco en la capital de Estados Unidos y que buscan precisamente revertir ese vacío. Tras una selección previa, 16 jóvenes emprendedores latinoamericanos presentaron sus proyectos de innovación ante un foro con inversores privados, y representantes del BID y otros organismos. El objetivo es dar a conocer los proyectos y establecer sinergias que puedan llevar a apoyos económicos.

La inversión latinoamericana en I+D ha pasado en dos décadas del 0,48% del PIB al 0,78%, pero sigue lejos del 2,8% de EE UU o del 3,9% de Finlandia

El contexto actual invita a ello. El colombiano Moreno -que lleva en el cargo desde 2005- cree que la innovación puede ayudar a amortiguar la desaceleración económica que acecha a América Latina. “No hay duda de que los vientos cambiaron, tuvimos vientos a favor con un consumo muy importante de China, buenos precios y tasas de interés bajas. Todo esto está cambiando y eso significa que tenemos que hacer mayores esfuerzos internos, tenemos que remar más por cuenta propia y allí la innovación es una de las maneras de remar mejor”, señala.

Pero al mismo tiempo, el presidente del BID pide ensalzar los avances logrados. “Es verdad que tenemos esos déficits, pero también es cierto que cuando veo a los jóvenes que hemos escogido, una de las cosas que nos falta es celebrar justamente los éxitos de los innovadores de la misma manera que se celebran en otras partes del mundo”, afirma Moreno, que antes de entrar al BID fue embajador de Colombia en EE UU. Y recurre a una analogía futbolística: “Nosotros en América Latina celebramos a los grandes futbolistas. Está muy bien y nos sentimos muy contentos por ejemplo los colombianos por tener un James Rodríguez en el Real Madrid. Pero yo me pregunto dónde está el James Rodríguez de la biotecnología”.

Como ejemplo del progreso en los últimos años, Moreno menciona el impacto que ha tenido la aplicación de técnicas de I+D en la producción agrícola en Brasil y Argentina. Son los dos países que lideran la inversión en innovación en la región. El gasto en I+D en Brasil representó el 1,21% del PIB en 2011, seguido a distancia por Argentina (0,65%), Costa Rica (0,48%), México (0,46%), Chile (0,45%) y Uruguay (0,43%), según los últimos datos disponibles recopilados por el BID.

Nos sentimos muy contentos  los colombianos por tener un James Rodríguez en el Real Madrid. Pero yo me pregunto dónde está el James Rodríguez de la biotecnología"

Moreno cree que en América Latina la innovación puede servir para paliar desigualdades sociales y ocupar los vacíos que pueden generar la falta de servicios públicos. El objetivo son “aplicaciones que pueden ser propias a nuestros problemas”. Como ejemplo, apunta, son muy distintas las necesidades de las clases medias latinoamericanas de las estadounidenses, que “son familias que tienen dos coches y una piscina en casa”.

Algunos de los proyectos seleccionados en las jornadas avanzan en esa dirección. Por ejemplo, un joven brasileño ha creado una empresa que utiliza tecnologías móviles para ofrecer atención sanitaria a comunidades con escaso acceso a la asistencia pública. La plataforma identifica, por medio de una serie de exámenes, el riesgo que tiene una persona de padecer enfermedades graves. Un colombiano ha impulsado un sistema de tratamiento de aguas, que genera un ahorro del 70%. Mientras, un chileno ha ideado un sistema de evaluación oftalmológica que reduce costes y tiempo de espera. “Nuestro espacio vital es construir soluciones de tecnología a nuestras propias necesidades”, remarca Moreno.

El presidente del BID sostiene que la innovación es un “ecosistema” con tres patas: educación, financiación y acceso a redes de emprendedores. “En la medida en que todo ese ecosistema funcione, los emprendedores tienen más capacidad de sobresalir”, apunta. Y subraya que el apoyo público es un factor importante, pero que también hay intangibles: “Entender que el fracaso es uno de los instrumentos mediante el cual se aprende para innovar mejor. Es algo que culturalmente nos falta”.
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2014/12/03/actualidad/1417562044_908650.html

lunes, 24 de noviembre de 2014

Germany´s position in Europe´s Crisis

BERLIN – Germany’s stance toward Europe has become one of rejection and disengagement. Its policymakers deny the eurozone’s crisis-ridden countries a more active fiscal policy; refuse to support a European investment agenda to generate demand and growth; have declared a fiscal surplus, rather than faster potential growth, as their primary domestic goal; and have begun turning against the European Central Bank (ECB) in the struggle against deflation and a credit crunch. On all four counts, Germany is wrong.
To be sure, Germany is justified in rejecting narrow-minded calls by France and Italy for unconditional fiscal expansion. After all, fiscal stimulus can work only if it supports private investment and is accompanied by much more ambitious structural reforms – the kind of reforms that France and Italy are currently resisting.
But Germany has all of the leverage it needs to implement the stability-oriented reforms that it wants for Europe. For starters, Germany, together with the European Commission, can compel France to pursue deeper reforms in exchange for more time to consolidate its deficit.
Germany cannot, however, indulge its obsession with supply-side reforms without also pursuing growth-enhancing policies. As Germany knows from its own experience in the early 2000s, the benefits of supply-side reforms – namely, improved competitiveness and higher long-term growth rates – take a long time to emerge.
Time is a luxury that Europe does not have. With every month that the economy loses productive capacity, the likelihood of stagnation and deflation rises.
The key to ending the European crisis is a stimulus plan that addresses deficiencies on both the supply and demand sides. That is why Germany’s refusal to help find a way to finance the proposed European investment agenda – which, for a limited time, would fund productive private investment – is a mistake.
Equally problematic is Germany’s focus on maintaining a fiscal surplus. With projections for German GDP growth this year and next revised downward by more than 0.6 percentage points in the last few months, the government could be forced to initiate a pro-cyclical fiscal policy to achieve its goal, inducing even lower growth at home and throughout the eurozone.
Given that the German economy’s output gap remains negative, the government should be implementing expansionary fiscal policy that targets the country’s infrastructure weaknesses. In this sense, Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble’s plan to spend an additional €10 billion ($12.5 billion) on public investment in 2016-2018 is a step in the right direction. But, at just 0.1% of Germany’s annual GDP, Schäuble’s scheme looks more like an attempt to quiet criticism from the rest of Europe than a genuine policy shift.
Germany’s fourth policy mistake is its apparent withdrawal of support for the ECB. Over the last seven years, the ECB’s actions have helped Germany’s economy and taxpayers as much as those of its neighbors. Moreover, the claim that the ECB’s purchases of asset-backed securities amount to “toxic loans” that transfer risk to German taxpayers is unfounded; after all, there have been almost no defaults since 2008.
Germany’s leaders need to recognize this – and to defend the ECB publicly from baseless fear mongering. Failure to do so may reflect an effort to forestall the rise of the far-right anti-European political forces, particularly the Alternative for Germany. But this strategy merely plays into the party’s hands.
If Germany refuses to take a more reasoned approach, it risks undermining the ECB’s credibility, thereby reducing the effectiveness of its measures. If that happens, the ECB may well be compelled to initiate large-scale purchases of eurozone government bonds through its so-called “outright monetary transactions” scheme – a plan that many German policymakers and economists staunchly oppose.
The German government can use its considerable leverage to compel France and Italy to pursue the structural reforms that both countries need, while allowing a growth-friendly demand stimulus to lift the threat of deflation hanging over the eurozone. And it has the authority to bolster the ECB’s credibility and thus its efforts to ensure future price stability and prevent financial contagion.
Europe needs a grand bargain, involving close coordination on structural reforms and fiscal and monetary policy. Germany’s relative economic and political stability, far from enabling it to disengage from such efforts, makes it among the most important protagonists in their development and implementation. The question is whether Germany’s leaders will recognize this before Europe’s economy falls into an even deeper slump.

Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/germany-wrong-on-european-policy-by-marcel-fratzscher-2014-11#jgzfx3ZlLVGRL7Ot.99